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NOTES
THE PRICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE
EFFICIENCY OF TITLE VII AFTER HICKS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Hicks Decision
On June 25, 1993, the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.' In a five-to-four de-
cision written by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that in employment
discrimination suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII)2 the plaintiff does not automatically prevail by
showing that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse em-
ployment decision is a pretext.3 Instead, the plaintiff must show
that the actual reason behind the decision was an illegitimate one,
such as discrimination based on race.4 This rule has been called
1. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 20Ooe-2(a)(1).
3. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748-51. The pretextual showing is part of the framework the
Court established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804 (1973). According to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first
present a prima facie case, then the defendant must put forth a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. at 802-03. See also infra notes 115-
20 and accompanying text. Once the defendant has offered such a reason, the plaintiff has
an opportunity to show that the reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804; see also infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. This framework has come to be
known as the disparate treatment theory of Title VII. See infra note 124 and accompany-
ing text. Hicks addresses what happens after the plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating
pretext. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
4. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. Another way of stating the holding is that the proffered
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the "pretext-plus" rule.'
Despite Justice Scalia's protestations to the contrary,6 the im-
mediate reaction was that the Court had worked a major change in
the procedural framework of Title VII cases.' Liberal civil rights
lawyers complained that the new ruling would make it much hard-
er to win Title VII cases.' Isabelle Katz Pinzler, director of the
Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) in New York argued "[t]his is going to make it next to
impossible for discrimination complaints to win."9 Charles Oldham,
who argued for the plaintiff in Hicks, agreed, asserting that the
decision would "make it five or ten times harder to prove discrimi-
nation."'" Similarly, Thomas Henderson from the Lawyers' Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law claimed that "[i]t makes it
much harder for plaintiffs to prove employment discrimination.""
Even more conservative lawyers who agreed with the decision did
not doubt that it represented a significant shift in the law. 2 This
Note examines the considerations that prompted the Court to make
this change.
The Court did not decide Hicks in a vacuum. The Court has
wrestled with the proper allocation of burdens of pleading, produc-
tion, and proof in Title VII cases since at least 1973." In that
reason must be shown to be a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id.
5. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy
of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 57
(1991).
6. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750 (stating that "[oinly one unfamiliar with our case-
law will be upset by the dissent's alarum that we are today setting aside 'settled prece-
dent."').
7. See, e.g., Overburdened, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1993, at 54 (stating that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has overturned established civil rights law to make it more difficult, if not
downright impossible, for employees to win bias suits"); When Lying Pays, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, June 29, 1993, at 2C (stating that "the Supreme Court overturned ...
well-crafted precedent"). For similar reactions from the legal community, see infra notes
9-12 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
9. David G. Savage, Justices Rule Fired Workers Must Prove Bias, THE L.A. TIMES,
June 26, 1993, at 1, 14.
10. William H. Freivogel, High Court Narrows Bias Test, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 26, 1993, at IA, 8A.
11. Max Boot, High Court Ruling Makes Proving Racial Bias Harder, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 28, 1993, at 7.
12. See id. (quoting Mark Levin of the Landmark Legal Foundation as saying "this
case will ... decrease the number of frivolous claims because now they'll be put to the
test"); Savage, supra note 9, at 14 (quoting Mona C. Zeilberg from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce as saying "it will have an important impact").
13. See generally Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination
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year, the Court decided the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,4 which was its first attempt to allocate burdens
of proof in disparate treatment Title VII cases. Since then, the
Court has often subtly shifted those burdens, almost always making
it harder for the plaintiff to prevail." Hicks, therefore, can more
appropriately be viewed as the most recent example of this trend
than as an isolated case. At the same time, a large body of litera-
ture has sprung up questioning the economic efficiency of Title
VII. 6 In general, the economic approach to law argues that dis-
crimination will disappear of its own accord in a truly competitive
marketplace; therefore, attempts to interfere with the market should
be carefully circumscribed. 7 Even those who believe that Title
VII is (or can be) efficient agree that it will be most effective (and
cost-effective) if we recognize the efficiency implications of the
law." Furthermore, as society and the economy slowly move to
eliminate discrimination, Title VII will also have to evolve to re-
main efficient in the changing circumstances. 9 However, there has
been surprisingly little work done on the efficiency implications of
the procedural burden allocations in Title VII cases.2'
Cases, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981) (discussing the lack of clarity for allocating bur-
dens of proof in Title VII cases); Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The
Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 1 (1990) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions involving Title VII).
14. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (holding that the plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case, then the defendant must articulate a legitimate reason for the action, and then
the plaintiff can show the proffered reason to be a pretext). Once again, this framework is
for disparate treatment, not disparate impact cases. See infra notes 124-25 and accompany-
ing text.
15. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Delinking Disproportionality from Discrimination: Pro-
cedural Burdens as Proxy for Substantive Visions, 23 N.M. L. REv. 87, 94-95 (1993)
(arguing that the Court has consistently retreated from the original, broad, remedial con-
ception of Title VII with which it started).
16. See generally John J. Donohue, III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
1411 (1986) [hereinafter Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?] (providing a thorough review of
the literature on the subject).
17. Id. at 1420-23; Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1987); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
18. See Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1430-31 (arguing that Title
VII may be efficient and that its actual efficiency is an empirical question which has not
yet been answered).
19. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1643-56 (1991) (arguing for the abolition of disparate
treatment in favor of disparate impact).
20. But see id. (arguing that the economics of discrimination require a disparate impact
approach).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. Title VII and Efficiency Concerns
The Court, in interpreting Title VII, has been influenced,
either consciously or subconsciously, by efficiency considerations.
As a result, the changes in the allocation of burdens over time can
be seen as attempts to keep Title VII efficient; Hicks is only the
most recent symptom. The Court in Hicks, however, has failed in
its attempt to maintain Title VII's efficiency because it has under-
estimated the pervasiveness of discrimination in American soci-
ety.2 The law that results, therefore, does not allocate the burdens
of proof properly. To demonstrate this, Part II of this Note will
examine the various economic theories of discrimination and the
policy implications for each; Part III will develop an economic
history of the Court's decisions in Title VII disparate treatment
cases, concluding with the Hicks case; and Part IV will chart a
more efficient course for the future. By fusing economic theory
with the "antidiscrimination norm,"" we can hope to achieve ajust, race-blind economy in the most efficient manner.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
A. Theories of Discrimination
In the most basic model of the labor market, economists gen-
erally assume that no discrimination exists, for it is not rational to
prefer one employee over another merely because of race.' Obvi-
ously, however, this model does not reflect the real world. In order
to conform neoclassical economic theory to observed reality, econo-
mists have posited two types of theories for the prevalence of
racial discrimination:24 taste-based discrimination and statistical
21. See infra notes 237-55 and accompanying text.
22. RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION LAWS 2 (1992). Epstein uses this phrase to refer to the general consensus in
contemporary American society that racial discrimination is wrong. Id.
23. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS
24-39 (3rd ed. 1988) (describing the functioning of the labor market without mentioning
discrimination); Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1412-15 (describing the
neoclassical theory of the labor market without discrimination).
24. While most of the economic theory has addressed itself to the problem of racial
discrimination, the principles are equally applicable (with some modifications) to gender,
age, or disability discrimination. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 267-392, 441-79, 480-94.
See also John J. Donohue, III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1347-56 (1989) (applying economic theories
to sex discrimination). As a result, this Note will focus on the economics of race dis-
[Vol. 45:507
THE PRICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
discrimination.'
1. Taste-Based Discrimination
Taste-based discrimination was first introduced into the neo-
classical economic model by Gary S. Becker.26 In this model, em-
ployers have a "taste for discrimination," such as preferring to hire
whites over blacks. In general, economists have identified three
possible sources of this preference.' First, the employers them-
selves are bigots and do not like associating with blacks; conse-
quently, hiring a black employee may impose a psychic cost on
them which is not imposed when they hire a white. Second, the
other (white) employees are bigots who prefer not to work with
blacks; and, as a result, hiring a black may either induce other
employees to quit or make them less productive.3" Once again, a
cost may be imposed on an employer who hires a black worker
which is not imposed if a white worker is hired. Third, the
employer's customers may be bigots and want to avoid dealing
with black employees; thus, if the employer hires blacks, some
customers may take their business elsewhere." This may impose
an additional cost on the employer who hires black labor. Any one
of these three sources of discrimination may make the cost of
crimination, keeping in mind that the issues are broader than that. Interestingly enough,
that is exactly what the Court does in Title VII cases. See infra note 165. Problems re-
sulting from this oversimplification will be addressed in Part IV, infra.
25. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1621-22. Strauss will be cited often in this discussion.
This is not because he is the only source but because he provides the most comprehen-
sive review of the literature. A full review of the literature is beyond the scope of this
Note.
26. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1st ed.
1957).
27. Id. at 6. While this theory can be applied to all minority groups, this Note will
focus on black Americans simply because the U.S. has a long history of discrimination
against blacks, and there* is better economic data available on the differences between
whites and blacks. However, at any point in this discussion, the word "minority" may be
substituted for the word "black."
28. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1622. The ensuing discussion of the sources and welfare
effects of racial discrimination should in no way be understood as an endorsement of
such discrimination as economically "rational." First, as is argued below, such discrimina-
tion is harmful to the economy as well as to the individuals in it. See infra note 34 and
accompanying text. Second, the point of this Note is to show how to effectively combat
this invidious discrimination; to win the battle and keep casualties to a minimum, society
must first understand the sources of discrimination. See infra notes 73-74 and accompany-
ing text.
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hiring a black worker .greater than the cost of hiring an equally
qualified white worker.
In this situation, fewer black workers will be hired than in a
perfectly functioning labor market, i.e., one without any discrimina-
tion.32 In addition, black workers' average wage will be lower
than white workers' average wage.33 A simple explanation is that
the higher cost of black labor created by discrimination is equiva-
lent to a tax on black labor. When any good is taxed, the demand
for that good drops as people switch to substitute goods or do
without. In this case, white workers would be the substitute goods.
Therefore, the level of black employment will fall. As it does, the
suppliers of black labor, i.e. blacks, will be forced to lower the
price of their labor in order to find employment, and the wage rate
will fall. Therefore, any otherwise rational employer who is a
bigot, or who has bigoted employees or customers, will hire fewer
blacks than he or she otherwise would and will pay them less than
similar white workers.
Simply because employers might believe themselves to be
"rational" in choosing to discriminate, however, does not mean that
such discrimination is efficient as a whole. In fact, there is general
agreement that racial discrimination imposes efficiency costs on the
economy as a whole.34 If an employer discriminates, it is apt to
turn down well-qualified black job applicants (burdened with the
high costs of discrimination) in favor of less-qualified whites. As a
result, the firm will be less productive than if it hired the "best
person for the job," who in this case is black. Multiply this effect
across all the firms in the country, and the economy will clearly
not produce goods at optimal efficiency. In addition, the rejected
black employees will have to move down the employment ladder
to find jobs, i.e., find work for which they are over-qualified.
Thus, they will not be using their talents and education to the
fullest, and they will be underutilized as a resource. Once again,
32. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1418.
33. Id.
34. See John J. Donohue, III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Leg-
islation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523, 524 (1987) [hereinafter
Donohue, Further Thoughts] (comparing the efficiency costs of discrimination with the
costs of trying to legislatively speed its elimination); Posner, supra note 17, at 514 (stat-
ing that nondiscriminating employers will have lower labor costs than discriminating ones).
But see EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 60-78 (arguing that rational discrimination may actual-
ly minimize firms' internal transaction costs by creating a homogeneous workplace and,
therefore, be efficient for society).
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racial discrimination is not economically efficient.
The good news is that economic theory suggests this ineffi-
cient discriminatory behavior will partially, but not entirely, be
driven out by market forces." First, the market should drive out
employers who are bigots. Bigots will either employ some blacks
at a lower wage or not employ blacks at all.36 If they choose to
employ blacks at the lower wage, they still will have to absorb
some of the psychic costs associated with dealing with blacks, i.e.,
the (reduced) black wage plus the psychic costs is greater than the
going white wage.37 A non-discriminatory employer will not have
to absorb any cost except the wage cost. Therefore, the unbigoted
employer will have lower costs and produce more efficiently. As a
result, the unbigoted employers could drive out the bigoted ones
with lower prices. Even if there were no unbigoted employers, the
flow of capital would drive out bigotry. Unbigoted people could
make a profit by buying out bigoted employers and running the
firm more efficiently simply by not discriminating.38
Alternatively, if bigoted employers do not employ blacks, they
will not be hiring the best workers, since they will prefer inferior
white workers to qualified black ones. Just as above, they will not
be operating efficiently and will be driven out by the same mecha-
nisms that drove out those bigoted employers who did hire blacks.
Therefore, bigoted employers will be driven out or at least forced
35. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1632. The ensuing discussion draws heavily on
Strauss' quite extensive review of the literature on the subject.
36. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
37. This can be illustrated simply. Assume that the going wage is $10/hour. Further
assume that the psychic cost to the employer has a monetary equivalent of $2/hour.
Therefore, for the employer to be fully compensated for hiring blacks, the black wage
would have to fall to $8/hour. In order for this to happen, the supply of black labor
would have to be perfectly inelastic. That is, no more blacks would choose leisure over
work at $8/hour than would at $10/hour. Such an inelastic labor supply is highly
counterintuitive, and certainly, no economist has ever found a perfectly inelastic labor
supply in any empirical study. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 23, at 30 (discuss-
ing how the supply of labor decreases when wages fall). Therefore, the black wage would
fall but would not fall to $8/hour. The difference between $8/hour and the actual wage
would be the cost absorbed by the employer. At this point, the reader may argue that
discriminators are better off since they are paying a lower wage for the same work.
While this is true in strictly monetary terms, it is not true in the broadest sense. Remem-
ber, the cause of the wage disparity is the $2/hour psychic cost absorbed by the employ-
er. When this is added to the monetary wage for blacks, the total cost is greater than
$10/hour. If the employer's response to this is a refusal to hire blacks, it will be shown
below how that decision will also be punished by the market. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text.
38. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1633.
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to behave as if they were not bigoted. 9
While discrimination will be driven out,' it is not clear that
it will be driven out immediately. Unlike the market for wheat, the
labor market does not clear instantly, so some discrimination will
persist for a time.4" Therefore, the market will not always be op-
erating at an efficient point.42
The market has a more difficult time driving out discrimina-
tion by bigoted co-workers. 43 As noted above, an employer with
bigoted employees has additional costs if a black is hired."
Therefore, in the short run it may be efficient simply not to hire
blacks. In this situation, however, other employers would have an
incentive to hire only blacks. Theoretically, a purely segregated
workforce would result with all-black and all-white firms.45 Obvi-
ously, while blacks and whites in a perfectly competitive market
would earn equal wages, we would not approve of such a segregat-
ed economy. In addition, given the relative starting positions of
blacks and whites in the economy, it is not hard to imagine that
there would be a substantial wage differential between whites and
39. It has, however, been argued that some discriminatory firms may persist. Donohue,
Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1422 n.31. Donohue cites several articles to
support this proposition. The most interesting arguments are found in Matthew S.
Goldberg, Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials, 97 QJ. ECON. 307,
318 (1982) (arguing that discrimination can persist if it is motivated by favoritism toward
whites instead of animus toward minorities), and RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WIN-
TER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 139-54 (1982) (arguing that
firms which fail to maximize profit may not always be driven from the market). While
these theories are interesting, this debate is beyond the scope of this Note. For present
purposes, the only relevant consideration is that the market may need help in driving out
discrimination; these arguments only buttress that point. See infra notes 70-84 and accom-
panying text.
40. It seems counterintuitive to argue that employer-based discrimination will be driven
out since it has persisted for such a long time. Several arguments can be made in re-
sponse, however. First, remaining discrimination can be a result of one of the other sourc-
es. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 59-69 and accompanying
text. Second, there may be imperfections in the market which prevent discriminators from
being flushed out. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1634. Finally, for a long time the market
was not allowed to function due to Jim Crow laws and other artificial restraints imposed
by the government. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 245-54; Strauss, supra note 19, at 1634.
41. Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 528; Donohue, Is Title VII Effi-
cient?, supra note 16, at 1426-27.
42. Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 528 (asserting that once the benefits
exceed the costs of discrimination, discriminators will be flushed from the system by
market forces).
43. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1635.
44. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45. BECKER, supra note 26, at 48.
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blacks.46 Alternatively, as above, the firms could hire blacks de-
spite the bigoted co-workers but simply pay them less to offset the
additional cost they impose.47
In the long run, however, employee-based discrimination
should be forced out.4" Firms which only hire whites will not
have the best employees and will have to look harder for employ-
ees since they can only use one race. In addition, they will not
have the benefits that minority workers bring to a firm such as
different skills and the ability to sell to minority communities.
Therefore, firms which do not have bigoted workers will have
lower costs and will operate more efficiently.49 As a result, firms
will search for unbigoted workers, and potential workers will re-
duce or eliminate their prejudices to become more desirable to
employers thereby eliminating this source of discrimination.
Unfortunately, this solution will occur in the long term. In the
short term, high information costs will hinder the functioning of
the market." For example, an employer who hires a black worker
and observes a decline in productivity will have difficulty deter-
mining the source of the decline and, due to prejudice, will more
likely blame the new black worker than the existing white ones."
Therefore, this discrimination will persist in the short run, and the
economy will not operate efficiently.
Unlike employer- or employee-based discrimination, consumer-
driven discrimination may persist in a free market. Under Becker's
model, such discrimination would disappear or become pointless.52
If the majority of consumers are nondiscriminatory, then nondis-
criminatory firms would have no additional costs since they could
find plenty of buyers for their wares even though they employed
blacks. 3 At the same time, discriminating firms would have high-
46. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1635-36. The argument is twofold. First, in such a situa-
tion, there is apt to be consumer bigotry, and since whites have more purchasing power,
white workers will do better. Second, since whites have a disproportionate share of
society's capital, they are in a better position to invest in firms which hire white workers
than blacks are able to invest in firms which hire blacks.
47. Id. at 1636 (citing BECKER, supra note 26, at 58; Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 6, 10-13 (1973)).
48. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1636.
49. Id. at 1636-37.
50. Id. at 1637.
51. Id.
52. BECKER, supra note 26, at 74-76 (asserting that balancing of tastes among all
consumers results in little or no effect overall).
53. This argument follows from Strauss, supra note 19, at 1638.
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er costs, since they would have to search for only white employ-
ees, and they would therefore have higher prices. As a result, only
the bigoted consumers would buy from them. The search for these
few consumers will be expensive and time-consuming, further
raising their prices and making it harder for them to make sales.
Obviously, the market will tend to drive this out.
The argument is not so clear if there are an insufficient num-
ber of nondiscriminatory consumers, however.' In that case, firms
which cater to discriminators will not lose many customers due to
their higher costs and will not have to search very hard for cus-
tomers. Therefore, they will not be driven out. Instead, the market
will become segregated, like the market with bigoted employees,
with some employers using minority labor to sell to minorities and
others using whites to sell to whites.5 Obviously, this is not a
state of affairs we should encourage. 6
Indeed, it is not clear that separate but equal would be the
result. 7 As long as there are bigoted consumers, then firms which
hire minorities run the risk of losing business to firms which do
not.5 If the risk is great enough, it is more profitable simply to
hire whites than to buck the trend by hiring blacks. Therefore,
there will be no market push to eliminate this kind of discrimina-
tion.
In sum, most taste-based discrimination should be driven out
by a perfectly-functioning free market. However, that will take
time, and it is quite likely that some discrimination will persist
indefinitely. As a result, the market cannot be relied on to remove
all discrimination without some intervention.
2. Statistical Discrimination
The second type of discrimination which may interfere with
the labor market is statistical discrimination.5 1 Statistical discrimi-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1638-39.
56. First of all, the result would probably not be equal. See infra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text. Second, society would lose the benefits gained from a mix of diverse
people and diverse ideas. Finally, by allowing segregation, society would make information
about differences expensive, thereby exacerbating statistical discrimination. See infra notes
59-69 and accompanying text. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 59-78 (arguing that
segregation resulting from voluntary preferences is preferable to interference by the gov-
ernment).
57. George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among Tradition-Oriented,
Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. EcON. 265, 276 (1985).
58. See id. at 274-75.
59. See generally Arrow, supra note 47, at 23-33 (arguing that imperfect information
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nation occurs when race is used as a proxy for costly informa-
tion.' In other words, due to the sordid history of race relations
in the United States, whites are generally better qualified for jobs
than blacks." For example, they are likely to be better educated,
be more productive, and are less likely to have criminal convic-
tions.62 Therefore, an employer faced with a white applicant and a
black applicant may believe the white to be more qualified. If
information were free, the employer could find out all the relevant
facts and make the efficient decision by hiring the most qualified
person, black or white. Information, however, is expensive to ob-
tain. Therefore, it may be efficient for employers to simply hire
whites and run the risk that they are hiring the less qualified work-
er because of the amount saved in information costs. Obviously,
minorities are apt to suffer greatly as a result of statistical discrimi-
nation.
This sort of discrimination may be efficient for employers, but
it is inefficient for the economy as a whole.63 This is because it
discourages investment in human capital through education and
training.64 There is no incentive, for example, for blacks to pour
resources and effort into education if they are going to be judged
only on being black. In other words, blacks do not reap the full
benefits of education and training. It merely improves the overall
status of their race and not their status as individuals; therefore,
they tend to underinvest. This can create a vicious, self-fulfilling
prophecy where blacks are discriminated against due to low pro-
ductivity, so they underinvest, so they have low productivity, so
they are discriminated against, and the cycle continues.6"
may result in discrimination); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and
Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 659, 659 (1972) (arguing that discrimination exists due to a
lack of information).
60. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1622. As noted earlier, supra note 25, Strauss pro-
vides the best review of the literature, so his work will be cited most often. This liter-
ature is quite extensive but is beyond the scope of the Note.
61. See infra notes 134, 188-92 and accompanying text. Once again, this should not be
seen as an endorsement of statistical discrimination as morally defensible. As Phelps has
said, "[d]iscrimination is no less damaging to its victims for being statistical. And it is no
less important for social policy to counter." Phelps, supra note 59, at 661. Furthermore,
statistical discrimination is bad for the economy as well as its victims. See infra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 134, 188-92 and accompanying text.
63. Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 532.
64. Id. at 532-33.
65. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1640. Alternatively, some writers have suggested that
statistical discrimination is societally efficient, at least in the short-run, because the infor-
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Regardless of whether statistical discrimination is efficient for
the economy as a whole, it is extremely difficult for the market to
drive out, especially in the short run. If it is efficient for each
firm, because the costs of occasionally hiring the less-qualified
worker are lower than the costs of obtaining information, the firms
have no incentive to stop discriminating. However, in the long run,
it may be driven out.66 Employers have an incentive to find more
accurate sources of information, which will be better determinants
of productivity than race. 7 Therefore, they will rely on race less
often. However, if the vicious circle sets in,68 then race may be a
good determinant of productivity and the market will not drive
discriminators out.
69
B. Role of Title VII
Whatever the theoretical reasons for the existence of employ-
ment discrimination, there is little question that it exists in the real
world.7" As a result, Congress adopted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."' Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."72 By imposing costs
on discriminators, such as the costs of litigation, settling claims,
and paying out judgments, Title VII makes discrimination much
less attractive economically and would therefore tend to discourage
it. While this is certainly in keeping with the antidiscrimination
norm, it is not clear whether such a blanket prohibition is econom-
ically efficient.
At this point, the reader may argue that the efficiency (or lack
thereof) of Title VII is irrelevant since the goal of Title VII, elimi-
nating discrimination, outweighs any potential efficiency losses.73
There are several responses to this argument, however. First, since
a utopian, perfectly-functioning market has no discrimination, such
a market should be the goal of any law combating discrimination.
mation costs required to bypass it are greater than the losses it causes. Posner, supra note
17, at 516. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 59-72 (discussing the costs associated
with maintaining efficiency, productivity, and diverse work).
66. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1643.
67. Id. at 1640.
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1643.
70. See infra notes 126-34, 177-92, 237-55 and accompanying text (documenting the
prevalence of discrimination).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
72. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
73. Epstein calls this the "antidiscrimination norm." See supra note 22.
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In other words, a perfect market without discrimination is better
than an imperfect market without discrimination. If efficiency and
lack of discrimination are not mutually exclusive, we should try to
achieve both. Second, in order to maintain a consensus in favor of
Title VII, we want to minimize its costs. While society may be
willing to pay a considerable amount to eliminate discrimination,
there is probably some price at which society will prefer discrimi-
nation.74 Therefore, we should keep Title VII as efficient as possi-
ble. Finally, even once we have adopted Title VII, we are better
off as a society if we can maximize its gains and minimize its
costs. As a result, even those willing to pay a very high price to
eradicate discrimination must consider the efficiency ramifications
of Title VII.
In considering the efficiency of Title VII, the general consen-
sus among law and economics theorists is that since the market
will tend to eliminate discrimination, Title VII is superfluous." As
a result, the costs that it imposes, such as litigation costs, adminis-
trative costs, and the cost of hiring potentially underqualified mi-
norities to avoid litigation, generate no benefits. Therefore, the
argument goes, it is grossly inefficient and should be abolished.
Professor Donohue has argued, however, that Title VII may be
an efficient weapon to use against taste-based discrimination.76 He
argues that while the market will generally, although not always,
push toward the efficient non-discriminatory result, it will not do
so quickly enough. Impediments in the market will delay the elimi-
nation of discrimination,"' therefore, the economy will not be op-
erating efficiently. Title VII, by imposing high costs on discrimina-
tors, reduces their profits, forcing them either to leave the mar-
74. For example, if we had to spend one year's gross national product (GNP) (i.e.,
everyone would be unemployed for a year) to eliminate discrimination, the "anti-discrimi-
nation norm" might evaporate.
75. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 9 (stating that "[c]ompetitive markets with
free entry offer better and more certain protection against invidious discrimination than
any anti-discrimination law"); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-18
(1962) (arguing that discrimination is less prevalent in areas with the greatest freedom of
competition); Posner, supra note 17, at 514 (arguing that competition will decrease dis-
crimination in the workplace).
76. See Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1426-31 (arguing that Title
VII may lead to an efficient result).
77. Id. at 1423-31.
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ket78 or to stop discriminating.79 In other words, Title VII forces
the labor market to function efficiently more quickly, without wait-
ing for a market transformation." This reduces the efficiency loss-
es from discrimination. Logically, if this gain outweighs the costs
associated with Title VII (including administrative costs, adjustment
costs for firms, litigation), then Title VII is efficient."
78. Id. at 1426. This is because the assets of discriminators will be bought at a bar-
gain by someone who will use them more efficiently, i.e., someone will not discriminate.
79. Id.
80. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 16, at 1427.
81. Id. at 1426-27. In response, Posner makes three arguments. First, he notes that
Donohue failed to take into account the costs of administering Title VII, pointing out that
there were 9,000 cases brought to court in the year ending in June 1986, plus countless
others not brought to court. Posner, supra note 17, at 514. Arguably, these costs could
make Title VII inefficient by outweighing the gains from reduced discrimination.
Second, Posner, in analogizing anti-discrimination measures to a law requiring the
adoption of new maritime technology, contends that the market will always move at the
efficient speed to correct discrimination, and any attempt to interfere will lead to efficien-
cy losses. Id. at 515. In addition, Posner argues that some discrimination is statistical and
should not be eliminated since it may be efficient. Id. at 516 & n.16. (The potential effi-
ciency of statistical discrimination is discussed supra at notes 62-64 and accompanying
text.) Prohibiting it may increase the costs of Title VII.
Third, Posner suggests that Title VII may not actually move us closer to the non-
discriminatory utopia. See Posner, supra note 17, at 517. He points out that Title VII
prohibits paying blacks and whites differently, which is easy to enforce. Id. Assuming that
blacks were generally paid less than whites before Title VII, the wage increase will make
employers less likely to employ blacks. While discriminatory hiring is still illegal, it is
harder to prevent than wage discrimination. In addition, Posner suggests that companies
will relocate to white areas to avoid having to hire blacks. Id. at 519. In fact, the litera-
ture is sharply divided on whether Title VII has improved black employment. Cf. EPSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 242-66 (reviewing the literature and arguing that the only improvement
was due to the elimination of Jim Crow laws); Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note
34, at 534-36 (reading the literature to suggest that Title VII has improved employment
prospects for blacks). Whether or not Title VII has actually had a salutary impact is
beyond the scope of this Note and requires detailed and sophisticated empirical study.
This Note is concerned with establishing an efficient procedure for implementing Title
VII.
Donohue has responded to each of these arguments in turn. See Donohue, Further
Thoughts, supra note 34 (replying to Posner's article). First, employing a detailed model,
he approximates all costs and benefits associated with Title VII, including administrative
costs, and shows how Title VII still can result in a net gain. Id. at 524-25. Second,
Posner's analogy to a new maritime technology is also flawed. Id. at 526-27. In that case,
there is old equipment and other capital which must be replaced at great expense, so it
may be efficient to get more use out of the still-serviceable old equipment. Id. However,
in the employment discrimination context, the problem can be solved immediately by
transferring the business from a bigot to a nondiscriminator. See supra note 38 and ac-
companying text. Therefore, the only cost of adapting to the new regime would be the
transaction cost. Finally, Donohue reads the ambiguous data to suggest that Title VII has
made some improvement in employment prospects for blacks and that Title VII, even if
imperfect, will still drive discriminators from the market by increasing their costs.
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Obviously, Title VII can play an important role in eliminating
statistical discrimination as well. By making statistical discrimina-
tion illegal, Title VII will raise the costs of discriminating, so that
obtaining the information becomes cheaper than discriminating and
there is no longer any incentive to discriminate. While this imposes
short-term costs on employers,82 it eliminates discrimination, there-
by preventing underinvestment in human capital. As a result, the
productivity gap between whites and blacks should narrow, and the
reasons for statistical discrimination should disappear. Therefore,
the economy will be more efficient in the long run. If the long run
gains outweigh the short run losses, then Title VII will be effi-
cient.8
3
In sum, both taste-based and statistical discrimination may
distort the functioning of the market, depressing the employment
opportunities and wages of blacks. While market forces may drive
out discrimination in the long run, they may not; and they will
certainly need help in the short run. Title VII can provide this help
and therefore can be efficient. However, once discrimination is
driven out, there should be no need for Title VII, because market
forces should prevent new discrimination.84 Therefore, Title VII
should, like the dictatorship of the proletariat, wither away.
Presumably, discrimination will not be eliminated overnight;
rather, it should gradually work its way out of the economy.
Therefore, Title VII, if it is to remain an efficient tool in the fight
against employment discrimination, must wither away slowly. In
other words, we should have less and less need for Title VII. As a
result, Title VII must change over time if it is to remain efficient.
Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 534-37.
82. Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 529.
83. Id. at 533.
84. This can be illustrated quite simply. First, any employers who engage in taste-
based discrimination in this state will immediately be put at a competitive disadvantage
since they will not be employing the best people available. Similarly, employees who are
bigoted will have difficulty getting jobs since there are no segregated workplaces, and
consumers will have nowhere to go that is segregated. Second, as Strauss points out, once
the workforce is integrated, there is little or no incentive to discriminate statistically.
Strauss, supra note 19, at 1641-42. Having an integrated workforce is a great source of
information so that information costs are no longer as high, and race can no longer func-
tion as a cheap proxy. Id. Therefore, once a non-discriminatory equilibrium has been
reached, there is no incentive for anyone to resume discriminating.
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C. Change in Title VII
This leads us to the question of how Title VII must change to
remain efficient. As Epstein points out, any attempt to root out
discrimination is subject to what economists call type I and type II
errors.85 A type I error is a rejection of a true null hypothesis,
commonly called a false positive. 6 This would be a finding of
discrimination where none existed. 7 A type II error is the accep-
tance of a false null hypothesis, or a false negative. This would
be a finding of no discrimination when it actually existed. 9 There
is always a tradeoff between type I and type II errors.' In other
words, any attempt to root out all discrimination will result in
many incorrect judgments against nondiscriminatory employers,
while an attempt to prevent overprosecution would let many le-
gitimate cases of discrimination go unprosecuted. Furthermore, the
tradeoff is almost never linear; i.e., the closer we get to the elimi-
nation of one type of error, the greater the sacrifices which have to
be made on the other type for any more improvement.9 For ex-
ample, reducing type I error from 10% to 5% might require an in-
crease in type II error from 5% to 10%, while further reducing
type I errors to 1% might result in an increase of type II errors to
25%.
In the Title VII context, eliminating either type of error would
obviously not be efficient. Successfully rooting out all discrimina-
tion would greatly increase the costs of administering Title VII and
the firms' cost of complying, possibly outweighing the gains from
the elimination of discrimination. In addition, it might encourage
employers to hire less-qualified blacks in order to avoid lawsuits.
This would actually generate efficiency losses. Similarly, if the
courts tried to ensure that there were no false findings, many real
cases of discrimination would go untouched, and Title VII would
not be efficiently reducing discrimination. Therefore, for Title VII
to reach maximum efficiency, the courts enforcing it must strike
the right balance between type I and type II errors.92
85. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 222-25.
86. JOHN E. FREUND, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 241 (3d ea. 1967).
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 223.
88. FREUND, supra note 86, at 241.
89. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 223.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 224.
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Since, as argued above, the market should reduce discrimina-
tion over time, the appropriate balance should also shift.93 For
example, the appropriate balance in 1965 would have probably put
most of the burden on the employer, since it was likely that the
employer was discriminating." Therefore, there is only a slight
risk of a type I error (a false finding of discrimination) even with
the burden shift, and we are more concerned with preventing type
II errors. By 1993, however, when there is less discrimination in
society,9" leaving all of the burden on the employer would proba-
bly result in a great number of type I errors, which would lead to
inefficiency. To keep Title VII efficient, therefore, the courts
should be subtly shifting the burdens of proof. In fact, that is
precisely what the courts have been doing. In part III, we will
examine the history of disparate treatment cases under Title VII to
show this process, which has culminated with Hicks.
III. AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TITLE VII
A. The Statute: Silent on Proof
As noted above, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."'96 However, the law is silent as
to how potential plaintiffs are to prove such discrimination.'
While it has always been assumed that direct proof of racial dis-
crimination ("we don't hire blacks here") is sufficient, such easy
cases are rarely encountered. As a practical matter, forcing plain-
tiffs to prove racial animus directly would result in very few victo-
ries for the plaintiffs.9
93. See supra notes 35-57 (suggesting that taste-based discrimination should be partly,
if no completely, eradicated), notes 63-69 (noting the difficulty of eliminating statistical
discrimination) and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 237-55 and accompanying text (discussing of the relative status of
blacks during the 1980's).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
97. See id. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17. The statute discusses enforcement by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and litigation of civil actions by the Attorney Gen-
eral but does not discuss the elements of an individual plaintiff's case.
98. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that
the 'McDonnell Douglas balancing test, supra note 3, is not necessary when direct evi-
dence of discrimination is presented by the plaintiff).
99. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1645 (arguing that employers are usually much too
sophisticated to discriminate openly).
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This state of affairs is inefficient. If direct proof of racial
discrimination were required, bigoted employers would hide their
discrimination, rather thati change their ways."t While we would
not have many false findings of discrimination, we would let many
real cases go without remedy. In other words, we would have
many type II errors. Therefore, discrimination would not be driven
out, so Title VII would not be efficient.
B. McDonnell Douglas: The Original Framework
Fortunately, the courts quickly came to the rescue. Drawing on
old civil rights rulings, many lower courts ruled that once the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifted to the defendant employer to show why the adverse
employment decision was made.'' The courts tended to treat this
prima facie case as an inference which could be drawn from cir-
cumstantial evidence, either by a showing that the minority was
qualified but passed over for a nonminority," 2 or that the firm
had a statistical disparity in its hiring, 3 or both. 4
The Supreme Court picked up on these threads in the seminal
case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 5 where it first laid
out the order of proof and requisite burdens in Title VII cases.1"l
The plaintiff, Green, was "a long-time activist in the civil rights
movement" who had been laid off from his position as a mechanic
by McDonnell Douglas in 1964 (before the passage of Title VII)
as part of "a general reduction in [the] work force. '"" He felt
strongly that he had been laid off due to his race, and following
100. Id. Of course, it could be argued that forcing them to hide their discrimination
would raise slightly the costs of discriminating, thereby making it less attractive. I think it
is safe to say, however, that this cost would be so minimal that only a very few discrim-
inators would be forced out of the market.
101. See, e.g., Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. of Broward Co., 455 F.2d
818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing, inter alia, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)
(shifting the burden to the state once a prima facie case had been made that blacks were
excluded from both the grand and petit juries)); Gates v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 326
F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1970) (noting that after plaintiff's prima facie case has been
made, it is important to look to the defendant for explanation), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th
Cir. 1974).
102. See Gates, 326 F. Supp. at 398.
103. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Weigland Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1043 (3d Cir.), vacated,
414 U.S. 970 (1973).
104. See Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1972).
105. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
106. Id. at 802-03.
107. Id. at 794.
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his dismissal he organized and participated in unlawful demonstra-
tions against McDonnell Douglas for which he was arrested."8
After these demonstrations, and after the passage of Title VII,
McDonnell Douglas advertised for mechanics; Green applied and
was rejected." As a result, he filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which eventually led to the
lawsuit."0 Essentially, Green argued that he had been discriminat-
ed against on the basis of his race and because he took part in
civil rights demonstrations."'
As the Supreme Court noted, the lower courts had a great deal
of difficulty trying to decide how to allocate the burdens of proof
on the issue of racial discrimination,"' so the Court granted cer-
tiorari to settle the issue."' The Court created a three-part proce-
dure for adjudicating Title VII cases." '4
First, the plaintiff has the initial burden of producing a prima
facie case." 5 To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff may
show
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from [equally-qualified people]." 6
This formulation was entirely new, and the Court neither cited to
108. Id. For example, Green parked his car in front of the plant gates during rush hour
to tie up traffic. Id.
109. Id. at 795.
110. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796-97.
111. Id. at 797. The lower courts agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff's participa-
tion in the demonstrations was not protected, because the demonstrations were unlawful.
Id. In sum, the key issue was whether plaintiff was not hired because of his race, as he
maintained, or due to his participation in the demonstrations, as the defendant maintained.
Id. at 798.
112. Id. at 801. The appellate panel had a majority opinion, Green v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir. 1972); a concurring opinion, id. at 344; and a
dissent, id. at 346. Then it revised the portion of the opinion dealing with the allocation
of burdens, id. at 352; which resulted in a supplemental dissent, id. at 353. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-02 n.12. In short, the law was not clear at all.
113. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798.
114. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
115. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
116. Id. The court did note that the prima facie case could be made differently in dif-
ferent circumstances. Id. at 802 n.13. Presumably, hiring an unqualified white instead of
leaving the position open would also suffice.
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any of the lower court cases nor to the earlier jury discrimination
cases for support." 7 In practice, this new formulation means that
almost any time a qualified black is not hired for an open position,
a prima facie case can be made out.
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant who must "articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ' n. Unfortu-
nately, the Court was not very specific as to how much of the
burden shifts. It failed to clarify whether the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant or merely the burden of production." 9 It is
clear, however, that if the defendant fails to produce a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory" reason, the plaintiff will prevail by default.,
Even if the employer succeeds in carrying its burden, howev-
er, it does not automatically win. Instead, the plaintiff must have
the opportunity to show that the defendant's proffered reason is, in
fact, a "pretext."' 2' The Court suggested that this may be done by
comparing the plaintiff to similarly situated whites: if whites with
the same shortcoming(s) were treated differently, it would create an
inference that the reason is pretextual.' 22 Once again, the Court
was not clear as to which party bears the burden of persuasion at
this stage of the proceedings.2 3 If this is seen as a rebuttal of the
legitimate reason, for example, then the defendant may still bear
the burden; alternatively, if this is a distinct step, then the burden
may have shifted back to the plaintiff. This three-step analysis
became known as the "disparate treatment" theory of Title VII, t24
117. Id. at 802; Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Wa-
terhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 615, 639-40
(1990) (noting that no earlier case explained how to make a prima facie case).
118. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
119. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 117, at 636-37. As Kovacic-Fleischer notes, the
lower courts confuse the concepts of inference and presumption. Id. at 637. If the prima
facie case allows the fact-finder to infer discrimination, then the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant, who must rebut the inference by a preponderance of the evidence.
If the prima facie case merely establishes a presumption, then the defendant only has the
burden of production. If satisfied, it will destroy the presumption. Id. at 634-35. To satis-
fy a burden of production, the defendant would have to introduce admissible evidence
which would provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, but there would be no need
to convince the factfinder of its truth. Id. at 637.
120. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
121. Id. at 804.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 807 (suggesting that the judge will make a determination at this junc-
ture).
124. Belton, supra note 13, at 1227. It has been argued that this distinction is super-
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as distinguished from the slightly older theory of "disparate im-
pact., , "~
The McDonnell Douglas framework was remarkably efficient
for its time period. In the early seventies, both taste-based and
statistical discrimination were rampant.16  For example, black
workers only earned 66.5% of what white workers earned in
1970,127 while black males only earned 64.4% of what their white
counterparts earned.'28 Even when factors such as differing educa-
tion levels are controlled, there is still a sizeable residual which
can only be explained by discrimination. 2 9 One study, in fact,
found that merely being black cost a typical worker $5763 in
197230
Beyond employment disparities, there is sociological evidence
of both taste-based and statistical racial discrimination. According
to poll data, in 1972, 40% of white Americans believed that they
should be able to segregate themselves from blacks.' 3' In 1973,
ficial and meaningless. See Chibundu, supra note 15, at 122 (arguing that disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact are just variations on a theme and are not really distinguish-
able). The Court, however, has disagreed explicitly at least twice. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 n.14 (stating that a different case would be presented if the discrimina-
tion resulted from employment tests as in Griggs).
125. Under disparate impact theory, developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), the plaintiff is not proving intentional discrimination at all. Kovacic-Fleischer,
supra note 117, at 658. Instead, the plaintiff is just establishing that an otherwise neutral
policy has a "disparate impact" on a protected class. Id. Disparate treatment, on the other
hand, merely uses the McDonnell Douglas framework as an alternative means to establish
intentional discrimination. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121
(1985). An economic analysis of disparate impact procedure is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of the economics of disparate impact, see EPSTEIN, supra note 22,
at 205-41; Strauss, supra note 19, at 1648-52.
126. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
127. Samuel L. Myers, Jr., How Voluntary is Black Unemployment and Black Labor
Force Withdrawal?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRtMINATION 81, 91 (Steven Shulman &
William Darity, Jr. eds., 1989). By 1973, the percentage had risen to 72.5%. Id.
128. JAMES P. SMITH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: 40 YEARS OF ECONOMIC
PROGRESS FOR BLACKS 6 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Chinhui Juhn et al., Accounting for the Slowdown in Black-White Wage
Convergence, in WORKERS & THEIR WAGES: CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE U.S. 107, 113
(Martin H. Kosters ed., 1991) (showing that the difference in the natural log of wages of
blacks and whites in 1970 was 0.40 (whites earned about 50% more than blacks), and
that after controlling for exogenous (non-racial) differences, such as education, experience
and regions of residence, the gap was still 0.25 (whites earned about 30% more)).
130. Richard R. Verdugo, Earnings Differentials Between Black, Mexican-American, and
Non-Hispanic White Male Workers: On the Cost of Being a Minority Worker 1972-1987,
73 SOC. SCI. Q. 663, 670 (1993).
131. AN AMERICAN PROFILE-OPINIONS AND BEHAVIOR, 1972-1989, at 478 (Floris W.
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64% of whites would have voted for housing laws which would
have allowed discrimination in renting or selling residences. '32 In
other words, a sizeable portion of the population had an aversion
to blacks and presumably was engaging in taste-based discrimina-
tion.
The populace also showed signs of engaging in statistical
discrimination. For example, as late as 1977, 51% of the white
population believed that the main problem of blacks was a lack of
education.'33 Therefore, they would be less likely to hire a black
they knew nothing about, only because they suspected him or her
to be poorly educated. In addition, firms had a strong incentive to
practice statistical discrimination. The average person of all races
had 12.1. years of schooling in 1969, while the typical black (or
"negro" in the language of government documents of the day) only
had 9.8 years of education.t34 As a result, race could be used as
a cheap substitute for education and its corollary, productivity. In
sum, an efficient rule would have to confront both forms of dis-
crimination, a task which McDonnell Douglas accomplishes.
First, the decision addresses taste-based discrimination by
requiring the defendant employer to come up with at least one
reason for the adverse employment decision which is not
pretextual' 35 If the real reason is race, then the plaintiff presum-
ably will be able to show that the offered reason is pretextual by a
comparison with similar white workers who are treated differently.
The Court says as much. 3 6 At the same time, it would not be
efficient to induce employers to hire unqualified, or underqualified,
blacks. By allowing employers to escape liability by articulating a
nonpretextual, legitimate reason, the Court is providing for efficient
employment decisions.
Furthermore, the Court seems to have struck the appropriate
balance between type I and type II errors. As argued above, dis-
crimination was fairly prevalent in 1973. Therefore, to be efficient,
the scale should be tilted toward the plaintiffs and against the
Wood ed. 1990) [hereinafter AN AMERICAN PROFILE].
132. Id. at 519. These statistics are simply the most glaring in a long string of poll
data that reveal a high incidence of discriminatory attitudes in the America of the early
seventies. See id. at 470-530.
133. Id. at 475.
134. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1970, at 110 (91st ed. 1970).
135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
136. Id.
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defendants. In other words, we suspect that when a black is not
hired, the real reason is discrimination. Therefore, we want to
minimize false findings of no discrimination and are not as worried
about erroneous findings against employers. The Court in
McDonnell Douglas certainly tilts the balance that way. First, by
making the prima facie case easy to prove, it puts the onus on
employers to justify nearly every failure to hire a black. Second,
by not limiting the defendant's burden to a simple burden of pro-
duction, the Court encourages lower courts to take a hard look at
the defendants' reasons. Finally, by making any failure to hire a
black risky (at least in terms of litigation expense), it induces
employers to hire blacks, all else being equal. In other words, the
Court correctly identified the problem as discrimination, not false
findings of discrimination, and tilted the balance that way.
The McDonnell Douglas framework also tackles the problem
of statistical discrimination. In order to avoid losing by default on
summary judgment, the defendant must offer a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason.'37 To provide one which will not be refuted
as a pretext, the defendant must gather information about the appli-
cants, both the ones to be rejected and the ones to be accepted. In
order to convince the trier of fact, this information will presumably
have to be accurate and related to expected job performance. Once
this information is collected, however, there is no incentive for the
firm to discriminate statistically. As noted above, statistical discrim-
ination is only advantageous when race is used as a cheap proxy
for information.' Therefore, by obtaining the information neces-
sary to defend a Title VII suit, the employer has lost its reason for
using race as a proxy. In other words, the Court, by raising the
costs of using race as a proxy, made information relatively inex-
pensive. Employers will thus switch to other sources of informa-
tion, and societally-efficient employment decisions will be
made.'39
There is some evidence that the Court was concerned with the
efficiency effects of its ruling. The Court noted that "[t]he broad,
overriding interest [of Congress in passing Title VII] .. . is effi-
137. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 117, at 636, 639 (arguing that the prima facie
case creates a presumption and that failing to rebut the presumption results in summary
judgment).
138. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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cient and trustworthy workmanship."'" Furthermore, the Court
quoted Griggs v. Duke Power Co. to the effect that Title VII "does
not command that any person be hired ...because he is a mem-
ber of a minority group,"' 4' clearly evincing a concern for effi-
cient employment decisions. 1
42
In addition, even if the Court were not specifically trying to
create an efficient rule, its conception of race relations at the time
could push it toward an efficient result. If the Court felt that dis-
crimination were a serious problem, it would be much more con-
cerned with ensuring that all discrimination was driven out and less
concerned with false findings of discrimination it would be more
worried about type II than type I errors, even if it did not view
them in the efficiency context. Indeed, the Court at the time was
extremely concerned about racial discrimination.143 It had recently
decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which held that statistical
disparities in employment decisions, even when resulting from
"neutral" tests, could not be condoned unless the tests were a
"business necessity."'" In McDonnell Douglas, the Court made it
clear that "Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise."' 4  In other words, the Court was much more con-
cerned with type II errors, even suggesting that type I errors (false
findings) did not exist. As a result, it allocated a relatively high
burden to the defendant employers, thereby greatly increasing the
costs of discriminating and discouraging employers from doing
so.146 In sum, nothing more than the Court's accurate perception
about the prevalence of discrimination could have led it to the
efficient rule.
140. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
141. Id. at 800 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
142. Of course, it could be argued that the court was simply using common sense in
providing these interpretations.
143. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "this Court has condemned signif-
icant state involvement in racial discrimination, however subtle and indirect it may have
been and whatever form it may have taken"); Chibundu, supra note 15, at 107 n.88 (ar-
guing that the Court took a broad, remedial approach to racial discrimination from 1971
to 1977).
144. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
145. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
146. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing the deterrent effects of
Title VII).
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C. The Burdine Refinement
As noted above, McDonnell Douglas hardly cleared up all the
confusion as to the allocation of burdens in Title VII cases. The
crucial remaining question was whether, after the plaintiff had
made a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the
defendant to prove its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, or
whether the only burden which shifted was the burden of produc-
tion. 47 In 1978, the Court took two stabs at clearing up the con-
troversy.'48
First, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,'49 the Court
further confused the matter. Explaining the burden which shifted to
the defendant, the Court stated that "the burden which shifts ... is
merely that of proving that he based his . . . decision on a legiti-
mate consideration."'"5 In the next sentence, however, the Court
went on to say that "[t]o dispel the adverse inference ... the [em-
ployer] need only 'articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.""' ' The Court had described the burden first as one of
persuasion, and then as one of production, helping not at all.
Second, in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Swee-
ney,' the Court claimed to settle the matter without really doing
so. It held that the defendant only needed to articulate a reason but
did not need to prove it.' However, the Court did not clarify
what it meant by articulation and thus did not clear up the confu-
sion. '
Given the tangled precedent, it is not surprising that a split
developed among the circuits.'55 The majority view was that the
defendant only had the burden of production once the plaintiff had
made out a prima facie case.'56 In contrast, the minority view
147. Belton, supra note 13, at 1237; Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 117, at 636-37.
148. Belton, supra note 13, at 1237.
149. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
150. Id. at 577.
151. Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)).
152. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
153. Id. at 25.
154. Belton, supra note 13, at 1239.
155. Id. at 1237.
156. See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 442 (3d Cir. 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery County Gov't, 620
F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir.
1979).
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read McDonnell Douglas and its progeny as requiring that the
defendant carry the burden of proof for its legitimate reason.'57
Presented with the opportunity to settle the dispute and choose the
more efficient theory, the Court granted certiorari in one of the
latter cases ' to resolve the conflict among the circuits.'59
In the case the Court accepted, Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine,'" the plaintiff worked for the defendant
as an accounting clerk in its Public Service Careers division, which
trained unskilled workers for public sector jobs. 6' After one pro-
motion, she applied for the vacant position of project director. 6
The position went unfilled for six months, when a man from out-
side the division was hired.'63 In addition, the plaintiff and two
other employees were laid off, although she was later rehired by
another division."6 As a result, she sued, alleging sex discrimina-
tion. 65 After losing in the District Court, she won a reversal from
the Court of Appeals.'66
The sole issue before the Supreme Court was the proper allo-
cation of burdens in Title VII cases. 67 Justice Powell, again writ-
ing for a unanimous court, set out to clear up the confusion. First,
he noted that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff."'68 Once the plaintiff has
157. See Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that an employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a legitimate
reason for its employment practice exists), vacated, 450 U.S. 972 (1981), cert. granted,
464 U.S. 913 (1983), and cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Burdine v. Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that legally sufficient
proof is needed before the trier of fact can find plaintiffs proof rebutted), vacated and
remanded, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
158. Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 447 U.S. 920 (1980).
159. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
160. Id. at 248.
161. Id. at 250.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 250-51.
164. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981).
165. Id. At this point, the reader may question what this case has to do with the eco-
nomics of racial discrimination. First of all, the Court does not distinguish between race
and sex cases. See id. at 259. As a result, the principles of this case apply to all race
cases. Second, the economics of the two are similar, so the same economic reasoning still
applies. See generally supra note 24. The problems that result from the lumping of race
and sex cases are discussed in Part IV infra.
166. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 251-52.
167. Id. at 250.
168. Id. at 253 (citing Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
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established a prima facie case, a presumption that the employer
discriminated is created.'69 If the employer does nothing in re-
sponse, then the plaintiff wins by default.7 Alternatively, if the
employer does choose to respond, the burden that shifts is the
burden of production.' In other words, the employer needs to
produce through admissible evidence7 2 a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the adverse decision. However, "[tihe defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons," so the burden of persuasion does not shift.'
Finally, if the defendant meets its burden of production, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant's reason is a pretext."
From an economic standpoint, Burdine made it harder to chal-
lenge taste-based discrimination while maintaining a strict line
against statistical discrimination. By clarifying that the burden of
persuasion always remains with the plaintiff, it made it harder for
plaintiffs to prove discrimination (at least in those circuits that had
shifted the burden to the defendant). In addition, by clarifying that
the only burden on the defendant was one of production, instead of
articulation, the Court made it easier for defendants to avoid sum-
mary judgment.' Thus, Burdine shifted the relative balance from
that of McDonnell Douglas, so that a greater effort was made to
reduce type I errors, possibly at the expense of some type II errors.
At the same time, Burdine had little impact on statistical dis-
crimination. Any qualified black who was not hired could still
present a prima facie case and shift some burden to the defendant
employer. To avoid a summary judgment, the defendant still had to
produce a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Therefore, the
employer still had to collect information to be able to defend itself
in court. As argued above, once the employer has acquired that
information, race is no longer a cheap proxy for the information,
24, 25 n.2, 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940)).
169. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 255 n.9.
173. Id. at 254.
174. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981).
175. At the same time, it should be noted that the prima facie case did not change. It
was still easy for plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment, and the defendant still lost if it
did nothing. In sum, Burdine should be understood as a refinement of McDonnell Doug-
las, rather than as an overhaul.
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so that no incentive to discriminate statistically remains."'
Thus, for Burdine to be efficient, taste-based discrimination
would have to be on the wane, while statistical discrimination
remained a problem. In fact, the economic data seem to confirm
that discrimination in general was on the decline. By 1980, black
males' earnings as a percentage of white males' earnings had in-
creased from 64.4% to 72.6%,"17 and the ratio for all blacks had
increased to 79.1% by 1976.78 Furthermore, the gap also nar-
rowed after taking into consideration factors such as education.'79
For example, Verdugo found that the cost of being black had de-
creased from over $5700 to $4365 in real dollars between 1972
and 1977. 8'
These numbers, however, only tell part of the story. While the
earnings gap had decreased immediately following McDonnell
Douglas, it had hit its nadir in the late 1970's and had begun to
trend upward just before Burdine was decided in 1981.' This
does not mean that Burdine was inefficient in altering the burdens,
176. See supra notes 66-67, 137-39 and accompanying text. Of course, it could be
argued that by putting the ultimate burden of proof on the plaintiff, the need to gather
information was reduced, since a fabricated reason would presumably avoid summary
judgment. There are two flaws with this analysis. First, the reason still would have to be
plausible to be effective, and that is much easier to do with accurate information. Second,
it does very little good to avoid summary judgment if the false reason can easily be
shown to be a pretext. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. Furthermore, if the reason is so
obviously at odds with the facts as to be fraudulent (for example, asserting that the appli-
cant did not have a high school degree when she in fact did), the employer risks sanc-
tions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In sum, smart employers
still would gather information.
177. SMITH & WELCH, supra note 128, at 6.
178. Myers, supra note 127, at 91. See also David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Trends in
Relative Black-White Earnings Revisited, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 85, 86 (1993) (noting that
blacks' median and mean percentage shares of white wages both increased from 63% in
1970 to 69% in 1980); James P. Smith, Affirmative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83
AM. ECON. REv 79, 81 (1993) (stating that the percentage wage gap between black and
white males had narrowed from 39.5% in 1971 to 28.4% in 1980).
179. See Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 113 (demonstrating that the difference in the
natural log of wages between whites and blacks decreased from 0.40 in 1970 to 0.29 in
1980 (in other words, the white wage advantage decreased from 50% to 35%), and the
residual difference (attributable to race) decreased from 0.25 to 0.21 (30% to 25%) over
the same time period).
180. Verdugo, supra note 130, at 670.
181. See Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 113 (stating that the residual log wage differ-
ence went up from .21 in 1980 to .23 in 1985); Myers, supra note 127, at 91 (stating
that black earnings had fallen from 79% of white earnings in 1976 to 73% of white
earnings in 1985); Smith, supra note 178, at 81 (stating that the percentage wage gap
increased from 28.4% in 1980 to 30.3% in 1983); Verdugo, supra note 130, at 670
(stating that the cost of being black increased from $4365 in 1977 to $5631 in 1982).
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however. First, although the gap was increasing, blacks were still
in a much better position than they were in the early seventies.'82
Second, the U.S. experienced a deep recession in the early eighties.
Since blacks were most likely the last hired before the recession,
they were apt to be the first let go, thereby artificially depressing
the statistics. Finally, we would expect the Court to lag behind
economic indicators for two reasons. First, it takes time for cases
to get to the Court, so it is always dealing with old facts. Second,
economic changes often only become evident over time; there is a
large gap between any phenomenon and its observation. 3 In
sum, the Court probably was correct in thinking that discrimination
had decreased since McDonnell Douglas.
Given that there was some decrease in discrimination, the next
question is whether that decrease was in taste-based discrimination,
statistical discrimination, or both. The poll data strongly indicates
that taste-based discrimination was waning. First, the percentage of
whites who thought that they should be able to segregate them-
selves had dropped from 40% in 1972 to 30% in 1982.'" Simi-
larly, the number of whites who opposed fair housing laws dropped
five points to 59% between 1973 and 1980,85 while the number
of whites who would vote for a black presidential candidate from
their party rose from 74% to 86% over the same period. 86 It is
clear that the aversion to blacks in the white population had dimin-
ished substantially during this period. Therefore, there was probably
less employment discrimination to eradicate, so the burdens on
defendants did not have to be so demanding. At the same time,
keeping strict burdens would probably result in a great number of
erroneous findings of discrimination, which is hardly efficient. 87
Therefore, by shifting the burden to make it harder for plaintiffs,
the Court was taking into account the decreasing taste-based dis-
crimination in America.
At the same time, statistical discrimination remained a serious
problem. While the average black in 1980 now had 12.0 years of
school, compared to 12.5 years for whites,'88 other differences
182. For example, the percentage gap in wages had decreased from 39.5% in 1971 to
30.3% in 1983. Smith, supra note 178, at 81.
183. Interview with W. Thomas Bogart, Professor of Economics, Case Western Reserve
University, in Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 17, 1994).
184. AN AMERiCAN PROFILE, supra note 131, at 479.
185. Id. at 519.
186. Id. at 526.
187. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
188. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
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persisted. As college education became more important, whites
maintained a significant advantage. In 1980, 17.1% of whites had
college diplomas, as compared to only 8.4% of blacks.' 9 There-
fore, there was still an incentive to statistically discriminate. Fur-
thermore, even if there was no reason to discriminate statistically,
people (especially whites) believed that there was reason to do
so. '9 The percentage of whites who believed that blacks' difficul-
ties were due to a lack of education was in the process of rising
from 51% to 53%."' In other words, even though they were not
entirely correct, whites still believed that they received a better-
educated worker if they hired a white than if they hired a black.
Moreover, whites also had reasons other than education for
statistical discrimination. In 1979, whites made up 49.6% of the
prison population, while blacks made up 47.8%.92 Given their
respective portions of the population, blacks were far more likely
to be in prison. Therefore, an employer hiring a white is, on aver-
age, less likely to be getting an ex-convict. In sum, while taste-
based discrimination may have abated, statistical discrimination had
not. Thus, Burdine was efficient because it realigned the burdens
affecting taste-based discrimination while not altering the barriers to
statistical discrimination.
The Court seemed aware that it was making this modification.
In correcting the district court, Justice Powell noted that "Title
VII ...does not demand that an employer give preferential treat-
ment to minorities or women."' 93 Nor, he asserted, was it "intend-
ed to 'diminish traditional management prerogatives,"' or to "re-
structure his employment practices to maximize the number of
minorities ...hired."'94 In other words, the Court was showing a
new deference to employers and was afraid of falsely finding dis-
crimination against them. At the same time, the Court still wanted
to combat true discrimination, but it "remain[ed] confident that the
McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief
1990, at 133-34 (110th ed. 1990) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1990].
189. Id.
190. As Strauss points out, statistical discrimination can persist for quite a while, even
when there is no rational reason for it. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1640-43.
191. AN AMERICAN PROFILE, supra note 131, at 475.
192. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1990, supra note 188, at 187.
193. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981).
194. Id. at 259 (quoting Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979) and citing
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978)).
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to demonstrate intentional discrimination."'' 95
Even if the efficiency effects were not specifically intended as
such, they may have resulted, as above, from the Court's view of
contemporary race relations. If the Court thought discrimination
was deceasing, it presumably would relax the rules without think-
ing about efficiency. In fact, Burdine comports with a general shift
in the Court's attitude toward racial discrimination, which was
moving from a remedial perspective to a narrow antidiscriminatory
perspective.'96 While not ignoring discrimination, the Court was
much more likely to give employers some leeway in their employ-
ment decisions. Perhaps the best statement of this philosophy was
in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, where Justice Rehnquist
described the issue as "whether the Court of Appeals had gone too
far in substituting its own judgment as to proper hiring practices"
for that of the employer.97 In other words, courts were not to
second-guess employers' decisions, but only to look for real dis-
crimination. In sum, the Court in this period viewed discrimination
as less of a threat, so they altered the burdens, keeping them effi-
cient in the process.
D. Hicks: Discrimination as Past History
Unfortunately, Burdine did not resolve all the questions re-
garding Title VII. The Court never clarified what happens in dis-
parate treatment cases after the plaintiff has shown that the
defendant's proffered reasons for the adverse employment decision
are pretextual'9 The majority of the circuits adopted what has
195. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
196. Chibundu, supra note 15, at 139. Chibundu argues that this strand of reasoning
can also be found in the Equal Protection cases of this period. Id. at 123-30. For exam-
ples of this trend, see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982), stating that
"[p]urposeful racial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of adverse differential
treatment. Absent such purpose, differential impact is subject only to the test of rational-
ity." See also New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding that a
rule excluding methadone users which had a disproportionate impact on blacks did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
197. Fumc Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 574 (1978).
198. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65, 101. Although the Court in Burdine stated that the
plaintiff "may succeed in [establishing intentional discrimination] . . . indirectly by show-
ing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence," it also stated that
the employer did not have to prove its proffered explanation to prevail; instead it merely
had to offer a legitimate reason. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Therefore, as Lanctot points
out, there was more than enough room for the lower courts to disagree on the proper
interpretation of Burdine. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65-67, 101-03.
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come to be known as the "pretext-only" rule 99 under which, if
the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the defendant's proffered
reason is a pretext, then a finding of illegal discrimination is man-
dated by law.2" On the other hand, a minority of the circuits
adopted what is known as the "pretext-plus" rule,2"' which does
not mandate a finding for the plaintiff merely because the plaintiff
proved pretext." 2 Instead, the plaintiff must go beyond showing
that the reason was a pretext to show that the reason was a pretext
for intentional discrimination.2 3 In other words, the plaintiff does
not win simply by demonstrating the proffered reason to be false.
Rather, the proffered reason must be hiding discrimination. Once
again, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to step in and render
the efficient decision.
The case the Court finally accepted, Hicks v. St. Mary's Hon-
or Center, 4 originated in the Eastern District of Missouri, which,
ironically, was the same court in which McDonnell Douglas was
filed.0 5 The plaintiff, Hicks, had been a model employee for the
defendant, St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by
the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources
from 1978 to 1983.21 In fact, he had even been promoted to su-
pervisor." In 1983, the administration of St. Mary's was reorga-
nized.0 ' While Hicks kept his job, his once excellent evaluations
took a turn for the worse and he was subject to repeated and se-
vere disciplinary action.2" He was demoted, and then, after a
199. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65.
200. See, e.g., Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20768 (8th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992), and rev'd and remanded,
113 S. Ct 2742 (1993); Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811
F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d
878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393,
1395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
201. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 66.
202. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992); Samuels v.
Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (Ist Cir. 1991); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d
823, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1989).
203. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 66.
204. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
205. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (subse-
quent history omitted); Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo.
1971) (subsequent history omitted).
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confrontation with his supervisor, he was fired in 1984.210
At trial, the plaintiff easily established a prima facie case, and
the defendant offered Hicks's disciplinary record and his confronta-
tions with supervisors as its legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons.2" The trial court, however, did not believe these
reasons," 2 finding that Hicks was the only supervisor punished
for his subordinates' violations, that similar violations by other em-
ployees were ignored or punished less severely, and that the final
confrontation was manufactured to provide an excuse for firing
him. 2 3 Although it agreed that the reasons were pretextual, the
court refused to find for the plaintiff.24 Instead, the court ruled
that while Hicks had "prove[n] the existence of a crusade to termi-
nate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather
than personally motivated.""' 5 In other words, while the reasons
were a pretext, they were not a pretext for racial discrimination.
The court offered several reasons for believing that race was irrele-
vant and that there was no institution-wide race problem: first, two
members of the board which disciplined Hicks were black; second,
his black subordinates were not punished; and, third, there was no
overall decrease in the number of black employees." 6 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that if the
defendant's proffered reasons were shown to be pretextual, the
plaintiff should prevail as a matter of law.17
Thus, the only question before the Supreme Court was wheth-
er the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that if the plaintiff
successfully demonstrated pretext, then the plaintiff should win as a
matter of law. 218 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Scalia
reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded." 9 The majority es-
210. Id.
211. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd
and remanded, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), and revid and remanded, 113 S. Ct 2742
(1993).
212. Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the judge sat as the trier of
fact in all Title VI trials. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102(c),
105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)) (declaring the right of any party
to demand a trial by jury).
213. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1250-51.
214. Id. at 1252.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd and
remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
218. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
219. Id. at 2746. 2756.
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sentially adopted the pretext-plus rule, holding that once the defen-
dant has met its burden of production by producing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption created by the plaintiff's
prima facie case "simply drops out of the picture.""22 The finder
of fact then must proceed to "the ultimate question: whether plain-
tiff has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against [him]' because of his race."22' The Court noted that if the
trier of fact disbelieves the proffered reason, that, combined with
the prima facie case, may "suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion, '  and "'[n]o additional proof of discrimination is re-
quired."'2 23 However, it rejected the argument of the Court of
Appeals "that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons com-
pels judgment for the plaintiff." 24 Instead, "it is not enough, ...
to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the
plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.""z  Justice
Souter, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, filed a
dissent.2 6
Despite Justice Scalia's argument that Hicks followed directly
from Burdine27 from an economic point of view, it clearly rep-
resented a change. First, the decision made it significantly harder
for the plaintiff to win a case. 28 Before Hicks, in most circuits,
plaintiffs merely had to show that the proffered reason was a pre-
text. However, after Hicks they needed to show that the pretext
was covering for racial discrimination. As previously noted, direct
evidence of racial discrimination is very hard to obtain. 9 In ad-
220. Id. at 2749 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
255 (1981)).
221. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253) (brackets in original).
222. Id. at 2749.
223. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993) (quoting Hicks v.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 113 S.
Ct. 2742 (1993)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2754.
226. See id. at 2756 (Souter, J., dissenting). A full discussion of the debate within the
Court is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that both sides claimed to be
following the precedent laid down in Burdine, although they did also offer policy argu-
ments to buttress their respective cases.
227. See id. at 2751-53.
228. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751-53 (1993) (Souter, J., dis-
senting).
229. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. See also Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2761-
62 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reasoning that plaintiffs are greatly disfavored since employers
are not likely to announce their discriminatory intentions).
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dition, the plaintiff not only has to rebut the reasons stated by the
defendant for the relevant action, but must also rebut potential
explanations which were not raised but could occur to the trier of
fact." As a result, "many plaintiffs . . will surely lose under
the scheme adopted by the Court today, unless they possess both
prescience and resources beyond what this Court has previously re-
quired Title VII litigants to employ."'" In other words, the Court
has restruck the balance between type I and type II errors,232
making type I errors (false findings of discrimination) less likely,
but increasing the chances of type II errors (letting true discrimina-
tion go unpunished).
Similarly, the Court's decision also impacts upon statistical
discrimination. The employer still has to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision or face summary judg-
ment.33 However, prior to Hicks, if the reasons were flimsy, the
plaintiff could merely show them to be pretextual and prevail.'
Therefore, it would behoove a defendant to gather information and
come up with a solid reason. Now, however, even if the reason is
shown to be a pretext, the plaintiff will not win unless actual racial
discrimination is shownY25 Therefore, a defendant can avoid sum-
mary judgment simply by fabricating a reason and has much less
to fear if it is shown to be a pretextY6 As a result, there is
much less, if any, incentive to gather information because a Title
VII suit can now be effectively defended without it. If information
is not gathered, then race can again become a cheap proxy for
information, and firms may have an incentive to engage in statisti-
cal discrimination.
Consequently, for the Court's decision in Hicks to be efficient,
both taste-based and statistical discrimination would have to be on
the decline. As with Burdine, the raw economic data are suscepti-
ble of several readings. In general, the status of blacks does not
seem to have improved in the time between Burdine and Hicks?37
230. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lanctot, supra note 5, at 129-30.
231. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
233. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748 n.3 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEQURE § 7.9, at
327 (3d ed. 1985); 1 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 70, at 568-69
(1977).
234. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
236. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
237. See John Bound & Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress: Erosion of the
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For example, black males' earnings held flat at 69% of white
males' earnings from 1980 to 1990.23 Even controlling for edu-
cation, some studies found that the unexplained difference (due to
discrimination) actually increased from 1979 to 1987.239
However, many economists have argued that the persistent gap
between whites and blacks is not due to discrimination; instead,
they blame other factors, such as growing income inequality and
growing educational disparities.240 For example, one study found
that while the percentage wage gap between black and white males
fell only from 28.4% in 1980 to 27.0% in 1989, it fell from 23.9%
to 15.2% when adjusted for educational changes and increased in-
come inequality.24' Similarly, another study found that while the
decrease in the rate at which the black-white earnings gap was
narrowing in the 1980's was 1.65%, it fell to 0.91% when educa-
tion and other factors were accounted for, to 0.80% when blacks
and whites with similar skills were matched, and to 0% when
greater income inequality was taken into account.242 In other
words, many economists believe that discrimination did decrease
but that it was masked by other factors.
Post-1965 Gains in the 1980s?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 32, 47 (Steven
Shulman & William Darrity, Jr. eds., 1989) (arguing that blacks lost ground from the late
1970s through the 1980s); Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 107-08 (discussing causes for
the lack of improvement in black wages); Nan L. Maxwell, The Effect on Black-White
Wage Differences of Differences in the Quantity and Quality of Education, 47 IND. &
LAB. REL. REv. 249, 249 (1994) (pointing out general agreement about the divergence in
the 1980s); Shelley A. Smith, Sources of Earnings Inequality in the Black and White
Female Labor Forces, 32 Soc. J. 117, 118 (1991) (showing that white women pulled
away from black women in earning power in the 1980s).
238. Card & Krueger, supra note 178, at 86.
239. Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 129. The reader may note that none of the data is
more recent than 1990. This is an unfortunate consequence of turnaround time in the eco-
nomics field, where data from 1990 is not quite, but almost, brand new. As a result, it is
fairly difficult to gauge the efficiency of Hicks since there is little current data. The diffi-
culty in determining what is efficient until many years after the fact is one of the many
rationales for the solution proposed in Part IV, infra.
240. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
241. Smith, supra note 178, at 81. The essential change in education is that there is
now a greater disparity in school quality between mostly black (mostly inner-city and
rural) schools and mostly white schools. As a result, blacks are not doing as well with
the same number of years of education. Maxwell, supra note 237, at 249. The increase in
overall wage inequality hurts blacks who tend to be at the bottom of the wage scale in
the first place. Id. at 249; Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 108; Smith, supra note 178, at
81-82.
242. Juhn et al., supra note 129, at 143. See also Maxwell, supra note 237, at 260
(noting that two-thirds of the persistence of the wage gap can be accounted for by con-
sidering changes in education and income inequality).
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The poll data are likewise mixed. First, some indicators show
that taste-based discrimination is decreasing. For example, the
number of whites who believed that they should be able to segre-
gate themselves from blacks decreased to 22% in 1989 (from 30%
in 1982),243 and the number who opposed open housing laws de-
creased from 59% in 1980 to 41% in 1989.2' On the other hand,
only 81% of whites would vote for a black presidential candidate
in 1989, down from 86% in 1982.245 Similarly, the number of
whites who would not send their children to a half black or mostly
black school stayed roughly the same from 1982 to 1989.246 As a
result, it is hard to conclude that taste-based discrimination de-
clined appreciably between Burdine and Hicks.
The case is more clear that statistical discrimination remains a
serious problem. 247 While the percentage of whites with college
degrees grew from 17.1% in 1985 to 20.9% in 1988, the black
percentage only increased from 8.4% to 11.3%.24 In addition, by
1991, those numbers had spread to 22% for whites and 12% for
blacks.249 Therefore, there was still an incentive to use race as a
proxy for education. Similarly, blacks still made up 46.9% of the
prison population in 1986, a decrease of only 0.9% from 1979.50
So race could also be used as a cheap proxy for criminality.
Furthermore, it appears that people were engaged in statistical
discrimination based on these traits. As noted above, the percentage
of whites who believed that blacks were poorly educated actually
increased in the eighties." In addition, the percentage of whites
who believed that blacks in general were poorly motivated in-
creased from 60% in 1985 to 63% in 1989.12 In other words,
whites still think that blacks are less qualified and are apt to dis-
243. AN AMERICAN PROFILE, supra note 131, at 478.
244. Id. at 519.
245. Id. at 526. Of course, this could be just a result of voter antipathy toward the
only serious black presidential candidate, Jesse Jackson. Alternatively, their antipathy to-
ward Jackson could be partly racial. In other words, when the theoretical became possible,
more people were opposed to it.
246. Id. at 500, 503.
247. See generally Strauss, supra note 19 (arguing that most, if not all, of the discrimi-
nation remaining in the labor market is statistical).
248. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1990, supra note 188, at 133-34.
249. Mark Whitaker, White & Black Lies, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 54.
250. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1990, supra note 188, at 187.
251. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. Statistical discrimination could also
explain whites' continuing fears of sending their children to mostly black or half-black
schools. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
252. AN AMERICAN PROFILE, supra note 131, at 476.
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criminate statistically.
Whatever its source, many recent studies have documented the
continuing prevalence of discrimination in the labor market.53 For
example, an Urban Institute study found that when white and black
testers with identical qualifications were sent in to apply for jobs,
the whites were 16% more likely to receive a job offer than the
blacks 5 4 Similarly, a government study using Anglo and Hispan-
ic testers found that the Hispanics were three times more likely to
encounter unfavorable treatment, while Anglos received 52% more
job offers. -5 In sum, while the numbers are mixed, there was
still plenty of employment discrimination in 1994, so the Court
was probably ahead of the country when it decided Hicks. The
Court has made it too easy to get away with discrimination.
Therefore, discrimination will not be driven out as quickly as it
could or should be, and the efficient, discrimination-free market
will not be achieved as quickly.
It is ironic that the Court's decision may be inefficient, be-
cause the Court in Hicks seems most clearly concerned with effi-
ciency. For example, one of Justice Scalia's reasons for adopting
pretext-plus is that employers may have difficulty discovering the
true reason for an employment decision.256 He argues that "[t]he
notion that every reasonable employer keeps 'personnel records' on
people who never became personnel ... seems to us highly fanci-
ful." 7 Here, Justice Scalia is arguing that the information costs
required to avoid statistical discrimination are too high, and it
would be more efficient not to meddle."8 That is, the losses from
information costs are greater than the gains from discrimination.
253. See generally Leroy Clark, The Law & Economics of Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment by David A. Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695, 1696-98 (1991) (examining recent
sociological research on discrimination); John J. Donohue, III, Advocacy Versus Analysis
in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1608-10 (1992)
(reviewing recent sociological research on discrimination) [hereinafter Donohue, Advocacy
Versus Analysis].
254. MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPOR-
TUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 61-66 (1991).
255. The GAO Report on Employer Sanctions and Discrimination: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1990).
256. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Cir., 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 n.5 (1993).
257. Id.
258. This is also Epstein's argument. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 76-78 (arguing that
it is efficient for rational discrimination to persist in private, competitive markets). This
has been established to be incorrect, or at least questionable. See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
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Interestingly enough, Justice Souter argues that the reverse is true
since "[m]ost companies, of course, maintain personnel records,"
the costs are not very high and are probably outweighed by thegains."9
Even if the Court were not specifically motivated by efficien-
cy concerns in deciding Hicks, the decision clearly reflects the
Court's view that discrimination is not much of a problem in the
nineties. Many commentators have noted that the Court believes
that the problem of race discrimination has abated and that the
Court should take less of a role in this area." In addition, the
Court has been very explicit in stating that it believes that discrim-
ination is a thing of the past. For example, in Freeman v. Pitts,
Justice Scalia suggested that the problem of discrimination in the
public schools was very much behind us and that the Court should
disentangle itself from the issue.26 ' He stated that
[a]t some time, we must acknowledge that it has become
absurd to assume, without any further proof, that violations
of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon
Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an
appreciable effect upon the current operation of schools.
We are close to that time.262
It is clear that Justice Scalia and the conservative majority on the
Court think that racial discrimination is rapidly becoming a relic of
American history. They are much more concerned with false find-
ings of discrimination than they are with preventing it, so they
have shifted more of the burden to the plaintiffs.
E. Conclusion
The Court has consistently shifted the burdens in Title VII
cases over time to make it harder for the plaintiff to win. As eco-
nomic theory suggests, this is the efficient result if discrimination
is decreasing. In fact, while discrimination has decreased percepti-
bly, albeit slowly, since the passage of Title VII, it has probably
259. Hicks. 113 S. Ct. at 2764 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
260. See, e.g., Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TuL. L. REv.
1267, 1302 (1992) (arguing that "[t]he Rehnquist wing assumes that formal equal oppor-
tunity has led (or can lead) to a society in which the race of others does not affect our
treatment of them"). See generally Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 13 (arguing that the
Rehnquist Court is taking a common law, employment-at-will approach to Title VII).
261. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1453-54 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 1453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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not decreased as much as the Court believes. As a result, the cur-
rent law makes it too difficult for the plaintiff to prevail, resulting
in too many type II errors (unpunished discrimination). This brings
us to the question of what rule would be efficient and strike the
right balance between type I and type II errors. This question is
the subject of Part IV.
IV. SOLUTION: A NEW, EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF BURDENS
Given that the Court, by adopting the pretext-plus rule in
Hicks, made what is probably an inefficient decision, 63 the ques-
tion is what would constitute an efficient allocation of burdens.
Strauss suggests that, since taste-based discrimination seems to be
on the decline and statistical discrimination is depressingly resilient,
disparate treatment theory should be abandoned in favor of dispa-
rate impact theory." This theory has several flaws, however.
First, as Clark points out, it would not be politically palatable.6
Second, as this paper noted, there is still a fair amount of residual
taste-based discrimination which disparate treatment can help to
drive out.266 Finally and most importantly, it can hardly be effi-
cient for firms to hire any available blacks, rather than the best
blacks. Yet, by ending disparate treatment and replacing it with
disparate impact, that is precisely what is encouraged. Firms will
be punished for not hiring enough blacks but not for failing to hire
a qualified black. Since information costs are still high, it may be
cheaper for the firms to hire the first 100 blacks that come through
the door than to do screening. Clearly, this is neither an efficient
nor desirable result.
Strauss's theory suffers from the same fatal flaw as the Court's
various approaches by trying to fit all employers into one frame-
work. However, all employers are not created equal; some will
discriminate and some will not. For example, let us assume that all
firms discriminated before the passage of Title VII. After its pas-
sage, the firms will change their behavior but not uniformly. Not
263. See supra notes 237-56 and accompanying text.
264. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1643-57.
265. Clark, supra note 253, at 1708-09 (pointing to conservative opposition to quotas or
anything that looks like one).
266. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. See also Clark, supra note 253, at
1696-98 (arguing against abandonment of disparate treatment lawsuits); Donohue, Advocacy
Versus Analysis, supra note 253, at 1608-10 (citing statistical data on employment dis-
crimination).
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every employer will discriminate less and less over time; rather,
some firms will stop discriminating while others will remain bigot-
ed.267 Eventually, we should have no discriminators left. Until
that point, however, we should treat discriminators and
.nondicriminators differently. With discriminators, we are not so
concerned with type I errors (false findings), but we are very con-
cerned with type II errors (letting them get away with it). On the
other hand, with nondiscriminators, we are relatively more worried
about type I errors. Similarly, a discriminator who does not have
many blacks in the workplace will lack information about them
and have an incentive to discriminate statistically. An employer
with black employees, however, will have acquired information and
will be less likely to discriminate statistically.268 In sum, we
should have not one allocation of burdens, but two: one for dis-
criminators and one for non-discriminators.
Therefore, the process and burdens should remain as they are,
with one crucial difference. The plaintiff, as part of the prima facie
case, should offer statistics showing whether or not the defendant's
workforce was representative of the relevant labor pool.269 (The
defendant, of course, could produce its own statistics demonstrating
its excellent record.)27 If the court found that the defendant had
267. See Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 514 (stating that discriminators
will not stop discriminating, but resources will move to non-discriminators); Strauss, supra
note 19, at 1633 (reasoning that since capital will move from discriminators to
nondiscriminators, some firms will discriminate and others will not).
268. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1641-42.
269. Obviously, the relevant labor pool is not the population at large, but the part of
the population that is qualified for the position. For example, if the plaintiff had applied
for a position at a law firm, the relevant pool would be lawyers. See City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (holding that the relevant proportions for
the purpose of set-asides was the proportion who were in a position to benefit). Addi-
tionally, the relevant comparison is to similar positions in the defendant's workforce. Ob-
viously, an employer which is being sued for firing a black vice president would not suc-
ceed in showing a good record by showing that it had just hired 20 black truck drivers;
it would instead have to show that it has a good history of hiring and promoting blacks
in upper management. Some may object that this freezes current .inequality in employ-
ment, since there are few blacks in some occupations because there are few opportunities
for blacks in those fields. However, if the solution is not to force employers to hire
blacks who are not qualified, that would be neither efficient nor fair to the employers.
Rather, if we merely force employers to hire the blacks who are qualified, more blacks
will become qualified and enter the field.
270. The burden would be on the plaintiffs to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer was a discriminator. While this may seem harsh in theory, in practice it
is not. First, records of minority hiring would be easy to obtain, since employers are
generally required to keep them and they would be accessible through discovery. Second,
even if the plaintiffs lose this stage, they would be no worse off than all plaintiffs are
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disparately few minority workers in similar positions, the burden of
persuasion would rest with the defendant to show that its proffered
reasons were the true reasons and not a pretext. On the other hand,
if the court did not find a disparity, .then the plaintiff would have
the burden of proving that he or she was discriminated against.
This bifurcated allocation of burdens would be efficient for
several reasons. First, it would protect nondiscriminators from false
findings (type I errors) by putting the burden on the plaintiff.27'
Therefore, they would not be encouraged to hire blacks simply
because they are black, and it would discourage frivolous lawsuits.
Second, it would impose a high cost on discriminators. Every time
they turned away a minority applicant they would have to shoulder
the burden of proof. As a result, the costs of going to court to
prove their case each time they turned down a black applicant
would quickly become onerous. This would tend to drive them out
faster or force them to behave like nondiscriminators 72 thereby
moving us closer to the perfectly efficient, nondiscriminatory mar-
ket. In addition, it would reduce the number of type II errors (false
findings of no discrimination), since the discriminator has the bur-
den of proof. 3 Finally, it deals efficiently with statistical dis-
crimination. As Strauss points out, firms which already have a
significant number of minorities are not lacking in information and
have no incentive to discriminate statistically, so we do not want
to waste resources on them. 74 Discriminators, though, are likely
to discriminate statistically. By putting the burden of proof on
them, we strongly encourage them to gather information. Once
discriminators do that, they no longer have an incentive to use race
as a proxy for information." 5 In sum, a two-track method is
more efficient than fitting everybody into one theory. 6
These advantages extend beyond the application of bifurcated
today. They could still win, but they would bear the burden of proof. See supra note
117-21 and accompanying text.
271. Remember, society is more concerned with type I errors when dealing with
nondiscriminators. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
273. Once again, with discriminators, society is more concerned with type II errors. See
supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
274. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1642.
275. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
276. Theoretically, it may be most efficient to develop a sliding scale of burdens, de-
pending on the record of the employer, but the efficiency gains probably would be more
than swallowed by the huge administrative costs of such a system.
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burdens to race discrimination. As noted above, the Court does not
distinguish between race and gender cases in allocating bur-
dens. " As a result, the same rules apply, regardless of the type
of discrimination alleged.278 Obviously, this leads to an inefficient
result. Gender and racial discrimination (to say nothing of age or
religious discrimination) will not be driven out of the economy at
an equal rate. Therefore, across all firms, the same test will not be
efficient for both types of discrimination. More importantly, even
individual firms may stop discriminating against blacks but not
against women, or vice versa. One test is again inappropriate. By
allocating the burdens based on the hiring record of the firm, this
method would allow for the efficient test to be applied in each
case. For example, a firm which no longer discriminates against
blacks but has an awful record of hiring and promoting women
would bear the burden of proof in a gender discrimination suit but
not in a racial discrimination suit.
In addition, a bifurcated burden allocation would save the
Court from ever having to alter the burdens again to maintain ef-
ficiency. Instead, the lower courts would apply the appropriate
burden in each *case. As discrimination in the workplace declined,
courts, relying on hard statistics instead of generalized guesses
about the prevalence of discrimination, would more often assign
the burden to the plaintiff. However, plaintiffs would bear more of
the burden only as fast as discrimination decreased. If discrimina-
tion did not decrease, the burdens would not shift. Therefore, Title
VII would wither away at exactly the efficient rate without any
assistance from the Court.
This has several advantages. First, it saves the Court's resourc-
es, since there is no need to rework the burdens every five to ten
years. Second, it allows for predictability and continuity in the law,
which would no longer be in flux every time the Court decided
that society had changed. Finally, and most importantly, it avoids
errors such as the one in Hicks. As noted above, it is extremely
difficult, even for trained economists, to determine exactly how
much discrimination exists in society as a whole and whether it is
abating.279 Furthermore, courts are particularly ill-suited for moni-
277. See supra note 165.
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 177-92, 237-55 and accompanying text. This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that there is often a long time lag between the occurrence of any
societal phenomenon and its observation by economists. See supra notes 183, 239.
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toring economic trends. On the other hand, it is relatively easy for
the courts to determine whether one employer has a history of
discriminating. In fact, making specific factual findings are what
courts do best. Therefore, the bifurcated allocation of burdens frees
courts from difficult societal determinations of the amount of dis-
crimination and allows them to focus on the narrower issues of
each case.
There are still problems with this approach though. First, there
are many firms that have excellent records which still occasionally
engage in discriminatory behavior. However, plaintiffs in these
cases would still have an opportunity to obtain relief; they would
simply bear the burden of proof. This puts them in no worse posi-
tion than all plaintiffs are in under Hicks. In addition, since the
prima facie case remains the same, it would still be easy for those
plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment.28 In other words, the only
change is for discriminatory employers, so no plaintiffs would be
worse off.
Second, a two-tiered approach would still have to overcome
political opposition to quotas,28" ' since it would encourage firms to
hire a certain percentage of blacks to avoid suits. The remedy for
this would be to allow whites to sue on the same ground as
blacks. While they would almost always bear the burden of
proof, 82 they could presumably win if the employer were engag-
ing in particularly egregious reverse discrimination.
In addition, as Posner argues, the bifurcated allocation would
encourage firms to locate in areas of low minority population so
they could avoid hiring many blacks.2"3 There are several re-
sponses to this. First, Donohue points out that this is not much of
a problem.2 In addition, people can move more easily than com-
panies, so they cannot run forever. Finally, this problem already
exists with disparate impact; while a two-tiered burden system does
not solve the problem, it does not create it either.
280. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
281. See Clark, supra note 253, at 1708-09 (rejecting the quota system as politically
objectionable).
282. Since there is presumably very little discrimination against whites, males, and other
advantaged groups in the U.S. today, society is more concerned with type I errors (false
findings of discrimination) than with type II errors (false findings of no discrimination).
See supra notes 271, 273. Therefore, it is more efficient for these groups to bear the bur-
den of proof in Title VII cases.
283. Posner, supra note 17, at 519.
284. Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 34, at 537-38.
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A final argument against the bifurcated burdens is that the
introduction of the additional stage will increase the costs of bring-
ing a Title VII action and, therefore, discourage complaints. Such a
disincentive would be good for unmeritorious claims. However,
deserving claims will still be brought since Title VII provides for
the recovery of attorney's fees, including expert witness
expenses.2 Therefore, it will actually increase the cost to an em-
ployer of losing a Title VII suit. In other words, a bifurcated allo-
cation of burdens will increase the costs of bringing frivolous suits
and make discriminators even more leery of potentially successful
Title VII claims since they will have to pay out higher attorney's
fees. This furthers our goal of targeting Title VII more precisely
towards discriminatory firms while protecting those who do not
discriminate.
In conclusion, then, Title VII can be an efficient tool for driv-
ing out racial discrimination and achieving an efficient labor mar-
ket. To do this, however, Title VII must change over time as race
relations in society change. In fact, that is precisely what the Su-
preme Court has done by allocating and reallocating the burdens of
proof in disparate treatment cases to keep it efficient. Due to the
inherent difficulty of this project, however, the court went too far
in Hicks, thinking that racial discrimination is less of a problem in
American society than it really is. In fact, the true solution is not
to provide one system of burden allocation but two: one for dis-
criminators and one for nondiscriminators. That way, the courts can
use Title VII to drive out racial discrimination without burdening
nondiscriminatory employers, and we can most efficiently achieve
the "antidiscrimination norm."
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285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. IV 1992).
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